Frequently Asked Questions About Darfur
I. Background
- What exactly does genocide mean?
- Why is it important to know about genocide?
- What is Darfur?
- What is life like in Darfur?
- Why is there genocide going on in Darfur?
- What exactly makes the situation in Darfur "genocide"? Why don't the EU and UN say it is?
- Who are the Janjaweed?
- Who are the rebels that are fighting against the government?
- What are IDPs? What are IDP camps in Darfur like?
- What is UNMIS? What is AMIS? Why haven't they been able to stop the violence yet?
- What is the CPA?
- What is the DPA?
- What is the "hybrid force"? Why is it significant?
- What has the United States done about Darfur?
- Why is China important to this conflict?
- How are Chad and the Central African Republic tied to the conflict?
- What are economic sanctions? How do they help the situation in Darfur?
- What is the ICC? What role does it have in the conflict?
- Is violence still going on after so long?
- Will natural resources end the conflict?
II. Policy: What Should Be Done on the Conflict? Why?
- Impose a cost for continued violence
- Call for leadership on a coordinated negotiation plan
- Protect civilians from violence
- Divestment
III. How Do I Get Involved?
I. Background: What Is Genocide? What Is Happening in Darfur? Who Are the Key Actors?
- What exactly does genocide mean?
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Genocide is an international crime that is punishable in time of peace or in time of war, and is defined by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. - Why is it important to know about genocide?
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Cases of genocide not only signal the deaths of significant numbers of human beings, but also the destruction of their future livelihoods and of the community's very identity. As global citizens, it is in our deep interest to know why hundreds and thousands to millions of people are dying as a result of a man-made disaster.
Samantha Power, in 'A Problem from Hell': America and the Age of Genocide, highlights five examples of genocide in the past:
- Armenians: 800,000–1,000,000 deaths (1915–1917)
- The Holocaust: 6,000,000 deaths of Jews; 5,000,000 deaths of Poles, Roma, Communists, and other "undesirables" (1938–1945)
- Cambodia: 2,000,000 deaths (1975–1978)
- Bosnia: 200,000 deaths (1992–1995)
- Rwanda: 800,000 deaths (April 6 through mid-July of 1994)
- Darfur: 400,000+ deaths (2003 to the present)
- What is Darfur?
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Darfur is a region in Sudan roughly the size of Texas.
- What is life like in Darfur?
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People in Darfur are used to living in a very challenging environment. Darfur has a semi-arid climate with limited arable land and little annual rainfall. The Sahara desert is known for its searing heat, recurrent drought and minimal infrastructure. However, whether it is by owning livestock, cultivating land, or being nomadic herders, Darfurians have found innovative means of survival. In villages, families of several generations live in compounds of several structures, usually surrounded by a four-to-five foot mud or rock wall. People live in round mud huts, or tukuls, with hard mud floors and thatched roofs. Most compounds also have one more open-air shelter to provide shade and protection from heat. Wealthier residents generally have larger compounds and more brick structures.
- Why is there genocide going on in Darfur?
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Watch Mark Hanis, Executive Director of GI-Net, explain the background of the genocide on C-SPAN.
Since Darfur ceased to be an independent sultanate in 1916 and included into Greater Sudan, the region has been historically excluded from political decision-making and has been isolated from processes of economic development in Sudan. This trend did not change with the peace deal in 2003 that ended a series of Sudanese civil wars of the late twentieth century. Frustrated by poverty and neglect, two Darfurian rebel groups launched a counter-insurgent uprising against the Khartoum government in February 2003. The government responded with a scorched-earth campaign, enlisting the help of militias of Arab nomadic tribes, known as the Janjaweed. Since then, the Sudanese government and the government-supported Janjaweed have used rape, displacement, organized starvation and mass murder to kill more than 400,000 people and displace over 2.5 million Darfurians. The government has manipulated the attacks to target individuals (primarily non-Arabs) who survive by means of agricultural livelihoods. This has served to increase the tension between the primarily Arab pastoralists against the agriculturalists who have been under attack.
- What exactly makes the situation in Darfur "genocide"?
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Watch Mia Farrow explain her own finding of why the crisis in Darfur is genocide.
Read the Physicians for Human Rights report, Assault on Survival: A Call for Security, Justice, and Restitution, which discusses this topic in detail.
Large numbers of non-combatant civilians are either suffering or dying as the result of large-scale, intentional violence committed by the government of Sudan or their proxy militias. The methods of destructions used can be characterized by attempts to eliminate the livelihoods of targeted populations of ethnic groups.
- Why don't the European Union or United Nations call it genocide?
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The UN and EU did not say it isn't genocide, they said they don't have sufficient evidence to call it genocide and say they are "tantamount to genocide". That is probably political obfuscation more than anything, especially fearing triggering actions that must be taken due to the Genocide Convention.
We know from being on the ground that even though the killing has slowed for the most part (though there are punctuated moments of village bombings and other attacks) the government of Sudan has brought about conditions calculated to destroy civilian groups, and the fact that they do so through very intentional and even laborious methods of blocking aid and preventing people from moving back to their villages to farm makes the intent very clear. So too does the fact that the airplanes used in bombing are theirs.
- Who are the Janjaweed?
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Watch a BBC interview with an ex-soldier of the Janjaweed or BBC reporter Jonah Fisher (Windows Media) in Darfur discussing the Janjaweed with footage of the militia and villages attacked by them.
The Janjaweed, or "devils on horseback", are militias comprised of regional Arab nomads that have organized during Arabs' rise to power in Sudan in the late twentieth century. They are currently funded by the government to kill, rape, torture and starve millions of people in the region of Darfur.
The rise of the Janjaweed can be explained by increased Arab immigration to Darfur and the consequences of the 1984 famine in Darfur. Due to a rise in tension in Arab politics, Arab leaders attempted to increase support by drawing in militias from their respective support networks in Chad, Sudan's neighbor. The droughts occurring in Chad at the time gave stimulus to this Arab immigration. As Arab presence increased, in 1984, a significant famine forced Darfurians to open up roads to another of Sudan's neighbors, oil-rich Libya, so that families could migrate, find work, and send some aid back home. The opening of these roads caused Islamist exiles to return from Libya with weapons, technology, and network with the Arabs that had emigrated from Chad.
The government of Sudan, primarily through their oil revenue, has supplied the Janjaweed with weapons, given them salaries, and even life insurance.
- Who are the rebels that are fighting against the government?
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There are two major rebel groups: the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Unfortunately, the rebels are characterized as being unable to agree upon a common political platform and continue to split in different factions that independently attack the government of Sudan.
Differences between the rebel groups
Experts Alex De Waal and Julie Flint describe the rebel forces as an "an awkward coalition of...a handful of professionals and disillusioned Islamist intellectuals...who dared to take on leadership."
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA)
Most notably, the SLA has split into three factions: 1) the SLA-AW, led by Abdel Wahid Mohammed El-Nur; 2) the SLA-MM, led by Minni Minawi; and 3) the National Redemption Front (NRF)
- The SLA-AW did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). This group demands compensation for refugee and IDP (internally-displaced people) populations. Leaders want Darfur to become an autonomous region, with a majority of regional seats held by the rebels and, furthermore, political representation on the national level proportional to population. They also demand involvement in the disarmament of the Janjaweed and other militias
- The SLA-MM signed the DPA. After the signing, the SLA-MM initiated combined military actions with the government of Sudan's army against the non-signatory rebel factions and, in some instances, civilians in areas under Minawi's control. The SLA-MM seeks for the provisions of the DPA to be carried out.
- The NRF is an ad-hoc military alliance that has recently formed of rebels who view the leadership of both Abdel Wahid Mohammed and Minni Minawi as weak.
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
The JEM has not signed the DPA. The JEM traces its foundation to the writers of the Black Book, a manuscript published in 2000 that details the structural inequity of Sudan. The JEM fundamentally differs from the SLA, as it espouses an Islamist ideology which it seeks to implement as it comes to power. With further splintering of the SLA and increasing support and ties with its networks in Chad, the JEM have recently been gaining more power.
- What are IDPs? What are IDP camps in Darfur like?
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Watch a UNFPA segment on women IDPs.
Read an ICRC publication on Internally Displaced People (2/2007)
IDPs are internally displaced people. For many civilians whose homes have been destroyed, IDP camps provide the only available source of food, medicine, and relative safety. Some camps were built quickly by incoming civilians seeking refuge, while others have been constructed more systematically to handle overflows. In some camps, thatched housing or shelters made of plastic sheeting are the most common, while in some areas tenants have begun replacing their housing with bricks made from local clay.
Food is provided on ration to each family once a month in camps that the World Food Program is able to reach, while the government of Sudan still blocks their access to many camps, especially in rebel held territory. The rations consist of local grains (millet, sorghum), salt, sugar, and oil. Because this is not a sustainable diet, civilians must trade parts of their rations or otherwise acquire fruits, vegetables, and meats. Many camps have markets at their entrances or in nearby towns where these foods and other goods can be purchased or traded. Firewood is also often found on sale.
Camp life can be a mixed blessing. Nutrition, health, and education levels are greatly improved in the most accessible camp, potentially exceeding even pre-conflict levels. Security conditions are volatile. When fighting is occurring near camps, these camps have been subject to search by the government of Sudan, which has led to reports of men being arrested and women being raped. For the most part, there are few men remaining in these camps as many have fled, been killed, joined one of the forces, or stay out of the camp to avoid endangering their families. Inside the camps, the presence of international aid workers likely helps to minimize violence, though searches may still occur in their presence, and often times humanitarian organizations require that their staff leave the camps in the evenings. Security at the outskirts of the camps is also problematic, with men (usually described as Janjaweed) often harassing, robbing, or physically assaulting women as they attempt to collect firewood (see our Civilian Protection project for more on this and what GI-Net is doing about it).
- What is UNMIS? What is AMIS? Why haven't they been able to stop the violence yet?
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UNMIS, United Nations Mission in Sudan, was established by the UN under Security Council Resolution 1590. UNMIS is specifically tasked with supporting the implementation of the peace agreement reached in 2003.
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter, UNMIS is authorized to take the necessary action, in areas of deployment of its forces, within its capabilities, to protect UN personnel and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The mandate authorizes 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 715 civilian police personnel. Though UNMIS has had a good deal of success in Southern Sudan in returning refugees to their homes, they have not been able to do much for Darfur.
AMIS, the African Union Mission in Sudan has renewable one-year mandates to "monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004 and all such agreements in the future". With this mandate, AMIS is limited on only "monitoring and verifying" and is unable to use force or coercive measures to promote peace.
Though AMIS troop levels have gradually increased to 5,703 troops and 1,425 police officers in September of 2006, the number of troops still remains far too small to deal with the scale of human rights violations going on in Darfur.
Given that UNMIS' mandate is specific to the peace deal reached in relation to the North-South civil war, the burden falls more on AMIS than UNMIS. There are a number of other factors that contribute to the shortfalls of AMIS in addition to the limits of its size and mandate. The African Union troops suffer from a lack of logistical training and experience to deal with a humanitarian catastrophe of this magnitude. Humanitarian intervention involves massive amounts of logistical coordination of movements of troops, equipment, vehicles and efficient deliverance of intelligence. AMIS, unfortunately, has not had the capabilities to adequately address these challenges.
- What is the CPA?
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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on January 9, 2005, is the culmination of more than two and a half years of negotiation between the two major political parties of Sudan: the ruling National Congress Party (NCP); and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The agreement gave the NCP the majority in government (52%) until democratic elections are to occur in 2009. Furthermore, after a six-year interim period, a self-determination referendum will be offered to the Southern government in addition to transitional areas such as Abyei. The CPA has been met with wide criticism, as the NCP continues to dominate policymaking and, in many areas, has been violating or delaying the implementation of various provisions of the agreement. In addition, the SPLM, who has been focusing most of their energy of reform and restructuring of the South, remains a weak political body that has just recently begun to transition from its guerrilla origins.
Implementation of the CPA has proved to be extremely difficult for many reasons – three of which are: 1) the agreement sets up over 50 national bodies and commissions to be formed, disarraying interpretations of implementation; 2) the crisis in Darfur has been distracting CPA implementation; and 3) the NCP strives to continue holding on to its power. Regarding this last point, according to the International Crisis Group, the government has especially been failing to implement the following six points of the agreement:
- Delaying legal reforms for democratic transformation
- Maintaining tight media restrictions
- Undermining the North-South border
- Delaying funding to the ad hoc North-South Boundary Commission and the national census
- Refusing the "final and binding" Abyei Boundaries Commissions Report
- Preventing oil sector transparency on revenue sharing with the South.
Another significant consequence of the shortcomings of the CPA has been the treatment of transitional areas, which are Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and the Southern Blue Nile states. In each of these areas, the government has been violating the CPA by refusing to grant them a special administrative status, particularly in Abyei due to the region's lucrative oil sector. As a result, militarization has been increasing in these transitional areas and signs of armed conflict have been emerging as the local populations demand self-autonomy and seek to be a part of the Southern government.
- What is the DPA?
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The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed on May 5, 2006, was signed between Sudan's government and a faction of one of the rebel groups called the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) led my Minni Minawi.
There are four main provisions of the DPA:
- Security arrangements that range from disarmament of the Janjaweed to protection of civilians
- Power sharing arrangements that are consistent with the CPA
- Wealth sharing arrangements that deal with the issue of compensation
- The establishment of a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation which will aim to help solve inter-Darfurian disputes over issues such as land.
Implementation of the DPA proves impossible as only one faction of a rebel movement has signed the agreement. The DPA also is under heavy criticism for, among other things, failing to provide the ways and means necessary for implementation.
- What is the "hybrid force"? Why is it significant?
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The "hybrid force" is the third phase of a process to incorporate UN resources into the AMIS force. As part of the first phase, known as the "light support package," the UN handed over medical support items ranging from a fully equipped ambulance to pharmaceutical products, such as drugs and vaccines, to AMIS. Under the second phase, "the heavy support package," which the Sudanese Government has endorsed, the UN provided some troops, police officers, civilian staff, helicopter gunships and other resources to AMIS. On May 25th, the UN Security Council approved the structure for the third phase of a process to transition the existing AU mission in Darfur (AMIS) to incorporate the resources of the UN. "The Security Council notes that agreement between the African Union and the United Nations on this joint report is an important development in the comprehensive approach to the peace process in Darfur," the 15-member body declared in a statement read out by its May President, Zalmay Khalilzad of the United States.
Security General Ban Ki-Moon's statement outlined two options for a mobile force "capable and ready to deter violence, including in a pre-emptive manner":
- A force of 19,555 troops made up of 18 infantry battalions, three infantry reserve companies, three surveillance companies and a force reserve company; three fixed wing surveillance aircraft, six to eight helicopters for tactical use and 18 military helicopters; and up to 120 liaison officers and 240 military observers;
- Or a force of 17,605 comprising only 15 infantry battalions and three rapid reaction companies "in order to compensate for the reduction in the infantry level through rapid response by air".
On July 31, 2007 the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1769 which authorizes an African Union-United Nations hybrid peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate. This allows the force to "take all necessary action" to:
- Protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers,
- Support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Sudan.
The ability of the force to confiscate illegal arms, something that is also authorized by Chapter VII, was removed from the mandate because of pressure from Sudan and China.
The threat of sanctions (see FAQ on sanctions) against parties that hinder the peace process was also removed.
The resolution authorizes up to 19,555 military personnel, up to 3,772 police, 19 formed police units with up to 140 personnel each and 4,000-5,000 local and international civilian personnel. The force could have a total of over 30,000 personnel making it the largest peacekeeping force in the world.
- What has the United States done about Darfur?
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President Bush Discusses Genocide in Darfur, Implements Sanctions: watch the video.
In July, 2004, United States declared the situation in Darfur to constitute genocide. This declaration led many to believe that the US would lead the Security Council to adhere to the 1948 Genocide Convention responsibilities. Unfortunately, due to domestic politics and conflicts with current US foreign policy, this leadership has yet to be seen.
However, the United States Congress has passed some legislation on issue. Last year, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (HR 3127/S 1462) which advocates for the expansion of the size and mandate of the African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur and increase logistical support. It also directs the government to assist the International Criminal Court (ICC) to bring justice to those guilty of war crimes in Darfur.
On May 29th, President Bush announced the following three actions to be taken by the United States:- The addition of 30 companies owned or controlled by the government of Sudan to its list of Specially Designated Nationals and an additional company that has been transporting weapons to the Sudanese government and militia forces. A comprehensive list of companies can be found here.
- Targeted sanctions against specific individuals responsible for violence.
- Consultation of the Secretary of State with the UK and other US allies on a new Security Council resolution that will apply new sanctions against the government of Sudan, individuals found to be violating human rights, or obstructing the peace process.
In addition, President Bush stated that "we will continue to push for UN support, including funding for the African Union peacekeepers who remain the only force in Darfur that is protecting the people."
- Why is China important to this conflict?
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Dave Eggers, author of What is the What, and Valentino Achak Deng, a refugee from southern Sudan whose story inspired Eggers's novel, discuss China's relationship with Sudan.
Watch highlights of a hearing on Darfur and the Olympics of 2008 in China.
Listen to Jill Savitt, director of the Olympic Dream for Darfur campaign, explain the goals of it and how citizens can get involved on Voices on Preventing Genocide, an interview program with Jerry Fowler from the Committee on Conscience (6/14/07).
China proves to be a vital factor in this conflict due to the combination of its heavy investment in Sudanese oil and its veto power it has on the United Nations Security Council. In order for a resolution to pass in the UN Security Council, a unanimous vote is required by the UN chapter. This means that China's economic interest in Sudan deters the entire Security Council from taking actions that would disrupt business and go against the government of Sudan. In addition, it is speculated that the proceeds of the Sudanese oil industry are utilized by the government to support the Janjaweed with weapons and technology.
- How are Chad and the Central African Republic tied to the conflict?
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These two UNHCR videos describe the violence that is spilling over into Chad.
Sayre Nyce, Congressional Advocate at Refugees International speaks to Jerry Fowler on Voices for Preventing Genocide about the situation in the Central African Republic as a consequence of the violence in Darfur.
As the refugee crisis in Darfur continues to be exacerbated with additional attacks by government forces and Janjaweed militia, the conflict has been spilling over to Chad and, recently, to the Central African Republic. To prevent refugees from escaping to Chad, the Janjaweed have been making efforts to monitor the border between Darfur and Chad tightly.
- What are economic sanctions? How do they help the situation in Darfur?
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Economic sanctions are economic restrictions, usually applied as a penal or retaliatory measure, that are implemented by one or group of countries upon another. They would help the situation in Darfur by preventing the government from continuing its operations that fund the ongoing genocide. Specifically, as the oil and energy sectors' revenue has been funding the Janjaweed, targeted sanctions become critical.
- What is the ICC? What role does it have in the conflict?
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Read the BBC Q&A on the ICC for more information.
This link will take you to ICC updates in Darfur.
The ICC names Darfur suspects.
"Sudan and the ICC: A Question of Accountability" by Nick Grono and David Mozersky in openDemocracy.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an international criminal tribunal that tries persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In early May of 2007, judges of the ICC have decided to issue arrest warrants against Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, the Sudanese Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, and Janjaweed militia leader, Ali Kosheib.
- Is violence still going on after so long?
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Yes. In late May, UNMIS released information that 140,000 people have been displaced in the first few months of 2007. UNMIS further reports that a fresh eruption of scattered fighting has been seen throughout the entire region of Darfur in May, 2007. Violence against humanitarian workers has increased. In addition, the government has recently begun bombing villages again to intentionally target the destruction of innocent civilians.
- Will natural resources end the conflict?
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The genocide in Darfur is a man-made disaster that targets the destruction of a specific group of people. The ultimate blame for this chilling phenomenon lies in the perpetrators who have and are systematically murdering, raping, and displacing innocent civilians. It is true that limited natural resources have contributed to the development of ethnic conflicts within Darfur. However, this is only but one factor that has given the Khartoum regime leverage to undergo its genocidal campaign. Many have become excited that a large, underground lake has been discovered underneath Darfur which will "end the conflict." Unfortunately, experts argue that, regardless of whether substantially more water becomes accessible or not due to this discovery, the suffering of Darfurians will not end unless the violence itself ceases, the Janjaweed is disarmed, and an effective peace process is agreed upon and implemented. As we have entered the fourth year of the genocide, the government has resumed the bombings of villages once again. 140,000 more people have been displaced in just the first few months of 2007. Though the development of natural resources will become important in the region's future, the most critical need in Darfur right now is direct civilian protection.
II. Policy: What Should Be Done on the Conflict? Why?
- Impose a cost for continued violence
- Call for leadership on a coordinated negotiation plan
- Protect civilians from violence
- Divestment
Impose a cost for continued violence
- Why not call for targeted air strikes against Sudanese aircraft and other military assets?
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If non-military punitive measures fail, then targeted air strikes against Sudanese aircraft, military and intelligence infrastructure, arms factories, etc. may be justified. However, as we have been unable to get the UN or individuals governments to meaningfully extend sanctions and other punitive measures on Darfur, air strikes are far less likely to actually be followed-through on. Additional threats which go unfulfilled only weaken our hand.
- Isn't it true that trying to pressure the government of Sudan (GoS) will just make them more difficult to negotiate with and will cause them to further limit humanitarian aid access?
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If greater pressure is placed on GoS, they may retaliate by hardening their positions or restricting access for humanitarian aid. The U.S. and the international community have measures at hand which can impose a serious cost on GoS, for example by preventing the oil companies they deal with from making transactions in U.S. dollars, by freezing the assets of the shadow companies they use to move money and pay the Janjaweed, by imposing a no-fly-zone so they lose their military trump card in Darfur, and by other measures. GoS knows these sanctions would harm their interests, so they threaten that imposing them will actually make things worse.
However it is short-sighted to think that we should therefore not pressure GoS. It is primarily their actions which have and continue to create the conditions that require humanitarian aid and political negotiations. Allowing them to set the agenda by claiming they will make the situation worse only brings us back to where we are now – giving them a free hand. Our best move is to apply these and other harsh measures in a graduated sequence until GoS makes the decision that peace and demilitarization in Darfur are the best outcome for them. GoS must face the decision as to whether or not it can bear these costs. If in retaliation they make the situation worse, we will further increase the costs on them.
- Won't China block any effort to pressure Sudan through the UN?
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Watch this short NBC report on the "Genocide Olympics?" campaign.
Listen to Susan Shirk speak about how China's preoccupation with its international image relates to the 2008 Olympics and their complicity in the genocide on Voices on Preventing Genocide, an interview program with Jerry Fowler from the Committee on Conscience (6/21/07).
We cannot be certain that China will allow strong Security Council resolutions such as a strengthened arms embargo on Sudan. However the record to date indicates that despite these concerns, China has not ultimately voted against measures once they reach a vote in the Security Council. Moreover, the need for Chinese support of Security Council resolutions should be made a target of pressure on the Chinese, including through the "Genocide Olympics?" campaign, which spotlights the connection between China and the genocide in Darfur. At the very least, it remains the appropriate action to move forward with the needed Security Council resolutions regardless of China's intentions. If China is willing to vote against such a resolution, then they will have to do so for the world to see.
- Why focus on a negotiated agreement? How can you negotiate with a genocidal regime?
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"A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan," an International Crisis Group report (July 26, 2007).
The government of Sudan is responsible for the majority of violence in Darfur and for creating the conditions that allow violence to further propagate. However they are not the only cause – rebel groups have also been involved in violence and, while less often targeting civilians, must also be brought to a peaceful solution. Moreover, it is a far harder task to get the government of Sudan to give up on Darfur while much of it is under rebel-control. A political agreement that addresses each party's need offers a way out, settling key issues in a way that will allow the parties to lay down their arms.
These issues include power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security issues, plus a host of issues directly affecting the civilian populations, including compensation, land ownership, the need for development and irrigation projects, and more. The Darfur Peace Agreement, signed by GoS and just one of the rebel groups in May 2006, attempted to provide such a solution. However it was not widely supported, and to make it workable it must be amended, and must be complemented by a more inclusive process if a useful agreement is to be reached.
Direct pressure on GoS as discussed above should be applied immediately to stop the violence and obtain a ceasefire with the rebel groups. The window opened by such a ceasefire must then be used to negotiate such an agreement, during which time pressure on all parties is critical to ensure that they find a political agreement the better option for their own interests.
- A negotiated agreement sounds important, but why focus on the issue of leadership?
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"Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process," an International Crisis Group report (April 30, 2007).
Negotiating an effective agreement is a tall order, and requires several conditions which have not yet been met. The rebel groups must be at least partly unified in order to create a position that reflects the interests of a large number of them and prevents splinter groups from spoiling the peace once an agreement is reached. While some groups have made efforts at unification, the conferences in which they attempt to work out such deals have routinely been bombed by GoS.
But perhaps the greatest challenge has been a lack of coordination and the leadership required to develop it. Nations with an interest in Darfur, either selfish or humanitarian, are not working together to develop a political plan that they will jointly use their influence to press the parties to move forward on. Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Chad, and South Sudan have each hosted or are planning to host mediation processes, sometimes with an agenda to favor one side or the other. And while joint pressure from multiple nations working in concert can produce tremendous leverage in holding the parties to this plan and guaranteeing the resulting agreement, nobody has taken a lead in forging this coordinated approach.
- If this needs to be an international process, why call for US leadership?
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A coordinated political plan necessarily requires the support of numerous international actors. However GI-Net's impact is primarily in the U.S. and the U.S. has been among the most active countries focusing attention on Darfur. We are therefore asking U.S. officials, particularly U.S. Presidential Envoy for Darfur Andrew Natsios, to play a strong role in working with other nations to put such a plan together and engage the appropriate stakeholders on it. This position was created largely for this reason, however Ambassador Natsios has made very little progress and the policy of relying only on UN envoy Jan Eliasson and AU envoy Salim Salim has not been effective.
- Why not call for immediately establishing a no-fly zone?
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Watch Darfur Genocide: Terror in the Sky that favors a no-fly zone.
Read "Khartoum Bombs and the World Debates" for arguments against a no-fly zone.
GI-Net is not opposed to a no-fly zone, but would prefer to first see nations and the international community make good on the sanctions and threats already made.
Aircraft provide the government of Sudan (GoS) with a potent weapon which they can use to bomb villages and rebel locations, killing civilians either collaterally or intentionally. They also provide the means of moving people and arms to re-supply their positions or prepare for attacks. Keeping these aircraft grounded could therefore help protect civilians, and by weakening GoS' military hand in the field would also likely drive to the negotiated table by worsening their prospects for military victory. On the other hand, with GoS military capabilities reduced, the rebels may seek the opportunity to advance. If they do, the increased violence will kill or displace more civilians. Thus if a no-fly zone is implemented, it should be done so after discussion with rebel groups and pressures them to use this opportunity for peacemaking. In addition, care must be taken to ensure it does not impede humanitarian flights.
A no-fly zone, while less violent than other forms of military intervention, is still military. As is the case with air strikes, it is preferable to impose the economic and diplomatic sanctions first and reserve a no-fly zone if these fail to impose great enough a cost. Moreover, each threat which is made by members of the international community but is not implemented only weakens its hand and strengthens GoS' perception that such threats are bluffs. If we still have not fulfilled the relatively costless sanctions already set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1591, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, and "Plan B," it is exceedingly unlikely that a no-fly-zone will be implemented. Therefore, we are not opposed to a no-fly zone once we have implemented the measures already passed or threatened, but call on the U.S. Administration and other actors to implement those measures first.
Nevertheless, given interest by the U.S. Congress and Administration in the idea of a no-fly zone, it is wise to move forward with planning and preparations while we continue our work to first implement non-military means of pressuring GoS. In doing so, however, we must address the potential negative consequences and humanitarian concerns noted above.
- Why not call for a full-scale, non-consensual military intervention?
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We would call for a full-scale military intervention if three conditions were met:
- It is believed that such a force would likely protect civilians in Darfur
- There is even a remote possibility that nations with the required resources would be willing to implement it, we would call for it.
- The diplomatic and economic sanctions available have been attempted or it becomes clear they will not be sufficient.
None of these conditions have been clearly met.
At present, an aggressive military intervention would have to be "non-consensual" – that is, it would occur without the permission of the government of Sudan, which whether justified or not, amounts to an invasion.
The most ambiguous case is the first: can a non-consensual intervention protect large numbers of civilians? Darfur is too large and too austere an environment to physically protect a large proportion of civilians around the clock. However there may be ways to use even a smaller force to keep civilians safer: For example, highly mobile units with excellent intelligence could respond rapidly to threats on villages or could target militia or military groupings after they make an attack. A small elite force could "go after" the Janjaweed or other perpetrators, hoping to either diminish their numbers or raise the risk of future attacks by so much that most members are no longer willing to fight. A similar force could also attack key infrastructure and equipment in order to frustrate the ability of armed groups to conduct operations. On the other hand, past cases of non-consensual military intervention have shown that such offensives do not always go as planned, and certainly come at the risk of potentially worsening the situation or at losing the lives of the intervening soldiers.
The remaining two criteria are much clearer. Not nearly enough has been done to implement the less violent economic and diplomatic measures or to coordinate a professional, full-scale peace process. Until these are done, the questionable step of military is neither justified according to the principles of the Responsibility to Protect, nor is it the strategy most likely to work.
Finally, it is our firm belief that no nation in the world is prepared to "invade" Sudan. While it may be the role of some activists to call for such an intervention on moral grounds regardless of this practical fact, GI-Net believes that imposing a cost by implementing the above mentioned sanctions, and pursuing a real, coherent peace process are the preferable options at any rate and should be the focus of our moral outrage and advocacy for the people of Darfur.